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The Illinois Bell Telephone Company Case 
By Percival F. Brundage
The recent decision of the supreme court of the United States in 
the Illinois Bell Telephone Company case is so important in 
respect to much debated depreciation questions for rate purposes 
that a resumé should be of interest to all accountants.
Justice Butler in a concurring opinion took the definite position 
that straight-line depreciation is not acceptable for rate purposes. 
He said: “Amounts sufficient to create a reserve balance that is 
the same percentage of total cost of depreciable items as their age 
is of their total service life can not be accepted as legitimate addi­
tions to operating expenses.”
The opinion of the court delivered by Chief Justice Hughes did 
not go so far as this but decided the issue rather upon the particu­
lar facts disclosed. After explaining that the company had used 
the straight-line method of computing depreciation, “a method 
approved by the interstate commerce commission,” the court held 
that, “the point is as to the necessity for the annual charges for 
depreciation, as made or claimed by the company, in order to 
avoid confiscation through the rates in suit. . . . The question­
able amounts annually charged to operating expenses for depre­
ciation are large enough to destroy any basis for holding that it 
has been convincingly shown that the reduction in income 
through the rates in suit would produce confiscation.”
In previous decisions, the supreme court has held that the rate 
base on which a fair return is to be computed is “the present 
value ” and not the original cost of the property used in the service 
rendered. In the United Railways & Electric Co. case (280 U. S. 
Pur 1930 A), the supreme court sustained the court of appeals of 
Maryland in holding that the allowance for annual deprecia­
tion should also be based upon “present value.” In the Illinois 
Bell Telephone Company case the court holds that the computa­
tion of the annual depreciation provision is not independent of the 
rate base. Furthermore, after this decision, it is difficult to see 
how straight-line depreciation can ever be sustained as a charge to 
operating expenses in determining whether a rate is compensatory 
or confiscatory. The decision, it is true, was based upon the facts 
of the particular case, but a similar relation between the amount 
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of accumulated reserves and the observed depreciation for any 
company that has been in business for a substantial number of 
years would of necessity seem to exist in all cases in which the 
straight-line method has been employed. This is of particular 
interest in New York state where the public service commission 
has recently prescribed straight-line depreciation as an accounting 
requirement for all utilities in the state.
The facts of the Illinois Bell Telephone Company case were 
briefly as follows. The Illinois commerce commission on August 
16, 1923, reduced rates applicable to part of the intrastate busi­
ness of the Illinois Bell Telephone Company effective October 1, 
1923. In September, 1923, the telephone company obtained an 
interlocutory injunction restraining the commission from enforc­
ing the rate reduction on the condition that, if the injunction were 
dissolved, the company would refund the amounts charged in 
excess of the challenged rates. It was the second time that this 
case had been before the supreme court, and that court in its deci­
sion of April 30, 1934, reversed the decree of the district court, dis­
solved the injunction and required the company to refund the 
amounts charged in excess of the rates in this suit during the 
whole period up to that date, amounting to approximately a mil­
lion and a half dollars a year.
The company in presenting its case had endeavored to sustain 
two contentions, which the court held to be contradictory, (1) 
that the depreciation charge against earnings on a straight-line 
basis was no more than was required in order to provide for the 
accruing loss of useful value during the period, and (2) that the 
property had been maintained in the best possible condition, was 
modern in every respect and that “the existing depreciation in the 
property, physical and functional, did not exceed 9 per cent. in the 
years 1923 to 1928 and 8 per cent. thereafter,” while the deprecia­
tion reserve accumulated on the straight-line basis had reached an 
amount in excess of 25 per cent. of the cost of the property. Chief 
Justice Hughes in dismissing the injunction said: “The company 
has had abundant opportunity to establish its contentions. In 
seeking to do so, the company has submitted elaborate estimates 
and computations, but these have overshot the mark. Proving 
too much, they fail of the intended effect.”
The court defines depreciation as follows:
“Broadly speaking, depreciation is the loss, not restored by cur­
rent maintenance, which is due to all the factors causing the ulti­
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mate retirement of the property. These factors embrace wear 
and tear, decay, inadequacy, and obsolescence. Annual depre­
ciation is the loss which takes place in a year. In determining 
reasonable rates for supplying public service, it is proper to include 
in the operating expenses, that is, in the cost of producing service, 
an allowance for consumption of capital in order to maintain the 
integrity of the investment in the service rendered. The amount 
necessary to be provided annually for this purpose is the subject of 
estimate and computation. In this instance, the company has 
used the ‘straight line’ method of computation, a method ap­
proved by the interstate commerce commission.”
The following discussion of the depreciation charge and com­
parison of the accumulated balance of the reserve with the ob­
served depreciation of the engineer’s estimate is very concise and 
constitutes the clearest statement on this point that has appeared 
in any court decision.
“Confiscation being the issue, the company had the burden of 
making a convincing showing that the amounts it has charged to 
operating expenses for depreciation have not been excessive. 
That burden is not sustained by proof that its general accounting 
system has been correct. The calculations are mathematical but 
the predictions underlying them are essentially matters of opin­
ion. They proceed from studies of the ‘ behavior of large groups ’ 
of items. These studies are beset with a host of perplexing prob­
lems. Their determination involves the examination of many 
variable elements and opportunities for excessive allowances, even 
under a correct system of accounting, are always present. The 
necessity of checking the results is not questioned. The predic­
tions must meet the controlling test of experience.
“In this instance, the evidence of expert computations of the 
amounts required for annual allowances does not stand alone. In 
striking contrast is the proof of the actual condition of the plant as 
maintained—proof which the company strongly emphasizes is 
complete and indisputable in its sharp criticism of the amount of 
accrued depreciation found by the district court in valuing the 
property. The company insists that ‘ the existing depreciation in 
the property, physical and functional, does not exceed 9 per cent. 
in the years 1923 to 1928 and 8 per cent. thereafter.’ The existing 
depreciation as thus asserted by the company, and the amounts it 
shows as the depreciation reserve allocated to the intrastate busi­
ness in Chicago (taking in each case the average amounts per 














Too little attention has been given by many utilities heretofore 
to the interrelation of the rate base and the depreciation charge. 
Telephone companies generally have been willing to compute the 
annual depreciation charge on a straight-line basis as approved by 
the interstate commerce commission, relying on several supreme 
court decisions that the rate of return must be calculated on pres­
ent value of the plant and not on original cost less computed de­
preciation. The case of the company as summarized by the 
supreme court appears to bring out the conflict of bases in a very 
direct way, and that court has now definitely indicated that a 
company can not eat its cake if it wishes to have it for a con­
sumer’s party.
On the one hand is the argument that the depreciation charge is 
correct and computed in accordance with the requirements of the 
interstate commerce commission. On the other hand is the state­
ment that the plant “was not functionally deficient, in any prac­
tical sense.” Although the balance of the depreciation reserve 
increased between two and three million dollars a year during this 
period, the company’s counsel stated that:
“The percentage of depreciation in the various classes of plant 
did not vary materially during the period, with the exception of 
three classes, namely, central office equipment, private branch 
exchanges and booths and special fittings. In the case of central 
office equipment, there were large installations of new equipment 
in 1929 which had the effect of raising the per cent. condition for 
the entire class from 92 per cent. for prior years to 93 per cent. for 
1929 and subsequent years. In the case of private branch ex­
changes, the percentage condition improved gradually from 88 
per cent. in 1923 to 94 per cent. in 1930 due to the large propor­
tion of new installations and correspondingly large retirements of 
the old. In the case of booths and special fittings, the percentage 
condition gradually improved from 78 per cent. in 1923 to 85 per 
cent. at the end of the period, in this case also because of abnor­
mally large changes of booths at pay stations. These are the 
changes which in the main account for the fact that the overall 
condition of the plant rose from 91 per cent. for the years 1923- 
1928 to 92 per cent. thereafter.”
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In view of the definiteness of the above statements, it is not per­
haps surprising that the court held that the burden of proof that 
the depreciation charges included in operating expenses were fair 
and reasonable had not been sustained.
“In the light of the evidence as to the expenditures for current 
maintenance and the proved condition of the property—in the 
face of the disparity between the actual extent of depreciation, as 
ascertained according to the comprehensive standards used by the 
company’s witnesses and the amount of the depreciation reserve 
—it cannot be said that the company has established that the 
reserve merely represents the consumption of capital in the service 
rendered. Rather it appears that the depreciation reserve to a 
large extent represents provision for capital additions, over and 
above the amount required to cover capital consumption. This 
excess in the balance of the reserve account has been built up by 
excessive annual allowances for depreciation charged to operating 
expenses.”
The court’s reference to maintenance as related to the deprecia­
tion charge is also interesting:
“In the process of current maintenance, ‘new parts’ are ‘in­
stalled to replace old parts ’ in units of property not retired. Such 
‘substitutions or repairs’ are separate from the amounts which 
figure in the depreciation reserve. The distinction between ex­
penses for current maintenance and depreciation is theoretically 
clear. Depreciation is defined as the expense occasioned by the 
using up of physical property employed as fixed capital; current 
maintenance, as the expense occasioned in keeping the physical 
property in the condition required for continued use during its 
service life. But it is evident that the distinction is a difficult one 
to observe in practice with scientific precision, and that outlays 
for maintenance charged to current expenses may involve many 
substitutions of new for old parts which tend to keep down the 
accrued depreciation.”
As already pointed out, Justice Butler goes even further than 
the court in taking a definite position against straight-line depre­
ciation. He gives a number of tables and statistics in support of 
the court’s decision and then concludes as follows:
“From the foregoing it justly may be inferred that charges 
made according to the principle followed by the company create 
reserves much in excess of what is needed for maintenance. The 
balances carried by the company include large amounts that never 
can be used for the purposes for which the reserve was created. 
In the long run the amounts thus unnecessarily taken from 
revenue will reach about one-half the total cost of all depreciable 
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parts of the plant. The only legitimate purpose of the reserve is 
to equalize expenditures for maintenance so as to take from the 
revenue earned in each year its fair share of the burden. To the 
extent that the annual charges include amounts that will not be 
required for that purpose, the account misrepresents the cost of 
the service.
“The company’s properties constitute a complex and highly 
developed instrumentality containing many classes of items that 
require renewal from time to time. But, taken as a whole, the 
plant must be deemed to be permanent. It never was intended 
to be new in all its parts. It would be impossible to make it so. 
Expenditures in an attempt to accomplish that would be wasteful. 
Amounts sufficient to create a reserve balance that is the same 
percentage of total cost of depreciable items as their age is of their 
total service life can not be accepted as legitimate additions to 
operating expenses. In the absence of proof definitely establish­
ing what annual deductions from revenue were necessary for 
adequate maintenance of the property, the company is not en­
titled to have the rate order set aside as confiscatory.”
If this had been the opinion of the court, the situation today 
would at least be clearer than it actually is. However, account­
ants must realize too well the necessity of deciding cases as they 
arise to have any just cause for complaint at the unwillingness of 
the court to go further than deciding the case immediately before it.
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